The distribution of land rights is a very important economic and political issue, and it played a central role in the transition processeses in Europe and Asia. This paper analyzes the impact of the distribution of land on household welfare by using subjective well-being (SWB) data from a rural household survey in Moldova, the poorest country in Europe. The recent land reform in Moldova provides a natural experiment on the impact of land ownership distribution on SWB. We find that household land holdings have a positive effect on SWB but neighbours' average land holdings have a negative effect on SWB. People, regardless of the land distribution and even given the relatively low living standards of these households, rate their welfare by looking at how much other people possess. The findings of the paper have more general implications as it is one of the first attempts to measure the impact of wealth, rather than income, on SWB.
Introduction
The distribution of land rights is a very important economic and political issue, particularly in poor countries. Land is a very important asset for the poor and many political conflicts have their roots in dissatisfaction with the distribution of land. This is especially the case in regions with an unequal land distribution such as in parts of Latin America and Africa. Land reform and land institutions also played a central role in the transition and development process in former communist countries in East Asia, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Within the transition world, the land reform processes differed importantly across countries as some countries, such as China transferred use rights on specific plots to farm households, others (such as Russia) transferred ownership of land in the form of shares to farm households, while yet others (such as the Czech Republic) gave land ownership rights back to those who owned the land prior to collectivization.
There is a vast literature on the impact of land reform and land rights on economic performance. For example, studies have identified the impact of the distribution of land rights on the allocation of land (Binswanger et al., 1995) and the functioning of land markets (Deininger & Feder, 2002; Sadoulet et al., 2001) , in particular in the presence of market imperfections (Skoufias, 1995; Yao, 2000; Carter and Salgado, 2001) . The efficiency effects of the different land reforms in transition countries has been analyzed by, for example, Deininger and Songqing (2003) , Kimura et al (2006) , Lerman (1999) , lerman & Cimpoies (2006b), Lerman et al (2004) , Lin (1992) , Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) and Vranken and Swinnen (2006) . However, there is much less economic research measuring the impact of the distribution of land on welfare. Several authors use a macro-economic perspective to argue that (un)equal land distributions have had major implications for the development of countries through its effect on the political (dis)equilibria of the countries (North, 1989; Binswanger et al 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005) . Micro-economic studies mostly focus on the effects of changes in the distribution of land rights. These studies typically rely on indirect information such as income effects and effects of (sub)optimal land allocation in order to infer welfare effects from land reform and land rights (re-)allocation (see e.g. Brasselle et al., 2002; Deininger & Jin, 2003; Deininger & Binswanger, 2001 ).
The objective of our paper is to measure directly how the distribution of land rights affects household welfare in poor countries. For this we use indicators of subjective well-being at the household level from a dataset collected by the World Bank in a 2004 rural household survey in Moldova for 500 households. Besides the obvious advantage of being a more direct measure of welfare, important additional advantages are that it allows to capture the aggregate benefits of land ownership, many of which are hard to measure indirectly. For example, it is well known that the income benefits of land ownership are depending on various market constraints, including credit and labor markets, and to what extent land can be used as collateral and the importance of its role in hedging risk -all of which are themselves conditional on other factors (Binswanger et al., 1995 . But land ownership has additional benefits, such as providing prestige, increasing political power, and cultural benefits (Platteau, 2000) , all of which are hard to measure.
Finally, SWB data allow to measure directly the distributional effects of land at the household level (see further).
Moldova offers an interesting case study to investigate these issues. First, Moldova is a very poor country and, with many people in the rural areas living in poverty, land plays a very important role for rural households. World Bank (2005) estimates put the rural poverty rate in Moldova at 60% based on headcount indices, among the highest of any of the former communist countries, and much higher than any other country in Europe (Macours and Swinnen, 2008) .
Agriculture accounts for around 40% of total employment, and land is a very important production factor and household asset for many of the rural households (Jacoby, 2004; Lerman and Sutton, 2008) .
Second, the combination of land ownership rights being distributed relatively recently through land reforms at the end of the 1990s and the absence of a functioning land sales market (as will be illustrated below), makes that land ownership in Moldova can be largely considered exogenous for the purposes of our analysis. Hence, this makes that we can use the recent land reform as a quasinatural experiment.
Our analysis is also related to a recent stream of literature which uses subjective well-being data as a measure of (self-assessed) utility. Although subjective (well-being) data should still be treated with some caution (as discussed in Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Krueger, 2006 and Kimball & Willis, 2006) , they are more and more accepted as reliable sources of information which can be compared interpersonally (see e.g. Schkade, 2007 and Layard, 2005) .
A variety of indicators are used to measure subjective well-being, including "happiness" or "satisfaction with life" indicators (such as used by Alesina et al., 2004; Di Tella et al., 2001; Gruber & Mullainathan, 2005 etc.) . Others use measures such as perceived consumption adequacy or perceived rank on the wealth ladder, which are closely related to a utilitarian perspective (see e.g. Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2005; Ravallion & Lokshin, 2001 .
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Studies in this literature have found that higher individual income has been found to have a positive causal effect on reported life satisfaction, albeit non-linear Layard, 2005) . However, contrary to what classical microeconomic theory would predict, income from a reference group is also influencing one's utility, and the impact is complex. Most authors find a negative effect of the well-being of a reference group on subjective well-being (Clark & Oswald, 1996; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2005; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Graham & Pettinato, 2002; Luttmer, 2005; McBride, 2001; Namazie & Sanfey, 2001; Van de Stadt et al., 1985) . One feels worse-off when the situation of one's peers improves.
However, some studies find a positive effect of peers' income (and inequality) on subjective well-being (Alesina et al, 2004; Senik, 2004 Senik, , 2007 . One explanation is that in an environment with high income mobility, higher peers' income gives hope that own income may start increasing as well soon. Others find that peers' wellbeing can have different effects for the rich than for the poor (Ravallion & Lokshin, 2005) or that the effect can depend on the relation one has to a certain group (Kingdon & Knight, 2007) . Furthermore, for industrialized countries in particular, welfare effects of own and others' material well-being might be determined by a wide variety of (positional) goods such as the type of car, clothing, electronic appliances, etc. However, these effects are difficult to measure due to data constraints.
Researchers relying on household surveys are often forced to use income or expenditure data to investigate welfare effects of peers' material well-being, which could be a poor proxy for perceived neighbours' well-being (see Ravallion & Lokshin, 2005) .
In this perspective, our study can also contribute to this literature since land holdings are more permanent indicators of wealth in a poor rural society and also easier to observe by others than income or expenditures. This allows to test on whether the reference group effect differs by the type of indicator and, more generally, to get greater insight into the complex hypotheses regarding interdependent utility (see Ravallion & Lokshin, 2001; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers some background information on the land reform process in Moldova. Section 3 contains the conceptual framework, where we discuss in some greater detail the channels through which absolute and relative wealth can influence subjective well-being. Section 4 contains an overview of the data, while section 5 deals with the empirical model and regression results. Section 6 concludes.
Land Reform in Moldova in a Comparative Perspective
The land reforms in the transition countries of Europe and Asia were a very important part of the overall transition process, both in politics and in economics. In China, the household responsibility reforms (HRS) in the late 1970s were the start of the transition process and had dramatic impacts on poverty in the rural areas. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the proposals and decisions to privatize the land after the fall of the Berlin Wall resulted in intense debates within each of the countries and upheavals in the countryside.
There were important variations in the implementation of the land reforms, as illustrated in table 1. The HRS in China transferred land rights from the collective to individual households. Similar land reform processes were followed in Vietnam and in Albania, although in both countries not only use rights but also ownership rights were transferred to households (see table 1). In many of the Central and East European transition countries land was returned to so-called "former owners", typically individuals who owned the land in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the Communist collectivization program was implemented. In several countries of the former Soviet Union it was decided to give land rights to those working on the collective and state farms, but not as specific plots, but as shares (Lerman et al, 2004; Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004) . Moldova, which was formerly part of the Soviet Union, initially followed the "Russian way" of land reforms, but later changed course.
In Moldova, under the Soviet regime, land was owned by the state and used by large-scale collective and state farms. Land privatization formally began in 1991, but effective reforms did not really take off until 1998 (Csaki and Lerman, 2002) . The Moldovan Land Code of 1991 envisaged a two-stage land privatization process (Muravschi et al, 2002) . In the first stage, the village land commission was to determine land shares (in hectares) for each eligible recipient. Land titles securing the holder's right to the land share were to be issued by the mayors' offices. Eligible individuals for land shares included active and retired farm workers as well as many other individuals living and (formerly) working in the village where the farm was located.
2 Each beneficiary was entitled, free of charge, to a share of farmland of equal standard size, adjusted for quality. Active and retired workers of collective and state farms were also entitled to a share of non-land assets, whose value was calculated based on the recipients' past labor contributions to the farms.
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The second stage, initiated only in response to a request from a recipient, was the distribution of physical plots to those wishing to exit from the collective or state farm. However the second stage of the land reform advanced only very slowly. Moreover, during the first stage of farm "share privatization" assets were stripped from large farms and production fell continuously.
Share privatization had a number of drawbacks. The most significant was that it did not sufficiently encourage large farms to change production practices (i.e. share privatization usually resulted in only "changing the sign on the door").
It also did not change the soft budget constraint implicit in government policies towards the farms, nor did it resolve the barriers to exit from collective or state farms. Farm directors and collective farm managers were generally not in favour of allowing their employees to leave the farm. Moreover, many details of the implementation of the programme were worked out only years after the initial decrees authorizing farm exit. A final drawback was the barrier to exit created by the accumulation of debt by old-style farming companies. Neither land nor property of farms with unresolved debts could be distributed because of creditor claims on them. With 91 percent of farms unprofitable in 1998 and a continuation of Soviet style soft budget constraints in Moldova, this was a major constraint on land privatization and restructuring (Csaki et al., 2002) .
A change of government in 1998 caused a dramatic change in the land reforms, with a large scale distribution of physical plots and dissolution of collective farms under the National Land Program (NLP). The NLP focused on the assignment of individual titles to land plots carved out from the large collective fields and distribution of collective non-land assets after first resolving the issue of outstanding farm debt (Lerman and Cimpoies, 2006a) . Under the NLP, the Moldovan government dissolved the former collective farms and distributed the land and non-land assets. .
A wide range of rural households received land under the NLP. In our survey, all households own land and 94% of them received land during the farm privatization process. A household owns on average 2.5 hectares of which it received on average 2.3 hectares of land during the land privatization process and almost all of this land (99%) was acquired in physical form (table 2). Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the distribution of land. The Lorenz curve in figure 1 indicates that 50% of the households received 20% of the land, while the remaining 50% received 80%. While this suggests important heterogeneity in the distribution of land, the differences were limited. The majority (around 65%) of the households received between 1 and 4 hectares. show that only 2% of households have bought and only 6% have sold land in the past decade. Almost all land exchange occurs through renting --a situation which is common with many other transition countries . 
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
We are interested in measuring the impact of the distribution of land on utility, hence the impact on one's utility of own land ownership and of land ownership by others. The standard assumption underlying micro-economic studies is that for each individual (or household) more land ownership generates higher utility, but that individual (or household) utility is not directly affected by land ownership of others (except indirectly through externalities or market effects). However, recent studies on the economics of happiness, and also research in other disciplines such as psychology, have shown that the latter assumption may not be correct. There are several reasons why other individuals' (households') land ownership may affect the utility of individuals (households). We first discuss three possible mechanisms through which such effect may occur and then discuss which hypotheses that can be formulated based on these insights.
The comparison effect
People care not only about their own wealth, but also care about what others have or how others perform. They feel worse-off when, ceteris paribus, the situation of their peers improves and vice versa. In other words, people care about their rank or status. The comparison effect has been identified in both the experimental and empirical economics literature, and in other disciplines such as psychology, sociology and medicine (see Clark, 2007 and Truyts, 2006 for excellent overviews). Rank or status can have an influence on one's utility through different channels.
Firstly, an increase in social status and the desire to outperform others can be understood as obtaining more self-respect, being an important consumption good (in the form of hormones as serotonin, testosterone and endorphins) to increase utility.
Secondly, higher status can lead to material and social benefits such as more friends, invitations to parties or the prospect to marry a rich counterpart which can lead to increases in disposable income. Furthermore, in the event of a crisis, those who are more wealthy compared to others will be more able to buy the scarce basic consumption goods and to survive (see Sen, 1981) .
The information effect
Although the comparison effect has received most attention in the literature, a positive, and thus opposite, effect of neighbours' welfare has been identified.
When people see the welfare of their peers improving, they may interpret this as a general improvement in economic conditions which might allow them to improve their own well-being in the (near) future. Those better prospects could lead to higher reported well-being.
The combination of the comparison and information effect can be illustrated by the classic story of Hirschman's tunnel effect, which goes as follows. Two lines of cars are standing still in a tunnel. At a certain point in time, one line starts moving.
Drivers in the second line would rather like that their line was moving than the other, but they could probably feel some relief, hoping that problems are getting solved and that their line will be moving soon as well: the information effect is dominating the comparison effect. However, if the first line keeps on moving faster and faster and the other line keeps on standing still, drivers in the second line might be getting upset and frustrated and they might conduct irresponsible behaviour such as switching line: the information effect is then dominated by the comparison effect.
Positive externalities
Higher neighbours' welfare can also increase one's (subjective) well-being due to positive externalities. As noted above, the comparison effect implies that a lower rank could mean that, in periods of crises, one might be in a worse position to get access to basic commodities, and therefore suffer rather more. However, the potential advantage of having a lower rank is that you might have a relatively rich neighbour that can provide employment (and thus income spillovers) or provide a safety net when you suffer from an idiosyncratic shock.
Hypotheses
The expected impact of own land on subjective well-being is positive, following the standard utility model. More interesting is the expected impact of others'
(neighbours') land ownership on subjective well-being.
The arguments explained above imply that neighbours' land ownership might have an impact on one's self-rated welfare. First, we should expect a negative comparison effect on one's self-rated utility. Land is an easily observable asset of great importance in rural areas, and therefore often has an important status function in poor countries. Higher neighbours' land holdings mean a lower status, which should lead to a negative effect on subjective well-being for the reasons described in the previous subsection.
Second, a positive information effect is less likely, as the amount of land in a village is fixed. If neighbours have more land, after controlling for own land holdings, there is not much reason to believe that one's land holdings will increase in the future given the thinness of the land sales market.
Third, whether there may be a positive externality effect is less clear ex ante.
If neighbours have roughly similar land holdings, there may be few positive externalities. However, if there are large landholdings in the neighbourhood they could provide either access to land through the rental market, or they could provide employment for farm workers -as is the case in many transition countries.
In summary, these arguments suggest that we should expect a negative impact of neighbours' land holdings on own subjective well-being, because of an important comparison effect. However, the impact may be different if there are externalities which are more important with large landowners in the neighbourhood.
Data
For the empirical analysis, we will make use of household level data collected by the World Bank in a 2004 rural household survey in Moldova. A two-stage sampling design was used to ensure country-level representativeness of the survey. In the first stage, the main farming system zones in the country were identified and representative districts were selected from these main zones. In the second stage, communities, farms and households within those zones were randomly selected. The type of agriculture practiced was the most important factor in the identification of these zones. However, there was also an effort to ensure coverage of a variety of farm types, different degrees of poverty and various degrees of isolation. From these farming zones, representative districts (Orhei, Nisporeni, Floresti, Cahul, Taraclia) were chosen. Next, approximately ten communities were randomly selected from each district. In the second stage, farming households within these communities were randomly chosen (approximately 14 per community). Because the rural and farming populations coincide in Moldova, the survey results there reflect both rural and farming populations. Considerable efforts were made to ensure that the surveyed regions reflect the main farming systems in the country. Therefore, the survey findings should be representative for the entire country.
The dataset includes data on 500 households and covers the sociodemographic household profile and time allocation of households, land ownership and land transactions, agricultural production and marketing, inputs and equipment for farming, and access to information, farm investments and finances, subjective ratings about well-being and the enabling environment for farming, household income, expenditures, and living standards. After deleting unusable or incomplete observations, we ended up with 437 observations used throughout the analysis. Table 3 offers some descriptive statistics of the sampled households. To see whether there are clear correlations between land ownership and subjective wellbeing, in table 3 the sample is divided into three main categories by the level of the single most important variable throughout our analysis, subjective well-being.
Our subjective well-being variable was measured by a question stating: "Please rate on scale from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) your household's well-being today." As the outer categories only contain few observations, we merged category 1 and 2 and category 4 and 5, ending up with three categories. The first category holds households who perceive their current well-being as very low or low and holds 37% of all observations. The second category contains households who perceive their current well-being as fairly good and holds around half of the observations, while the third category holds households with a high or very high level of well-being and embraces only 14% of all observations.
There are important differences between households with a (very) low, an average or a (very) high perceived level of well-being. The size of land holdings increases with the level of subjective well-being. Households reporting a (very) low well-being own on average 2.3 hectare of land, while households of the middle category own on average 2.5 hectare and those with a (very) high level of subjective well-being 3 hectare
To define the land holdings owned by the neighbours of household i, we calculate the average amount of land owned by all households in the village excluding household i itself. In the majority of villages, 10 households or more were surveyed so that for 92% of the observations, neighbours' land holdings were calculated for at least 10 datapoints. For 8% of the observations, neighbours' land holdings were constructed from less than 10 data points.
The average value of neighbours' land holdings is 2.5 hectares, which equals the average of own land owned. From the descriptive statistics in table 3 there is no clear relationship between the average vale of neighbours' land holdings and the level of subjective well being. Table 3 shows that a higher level of household expenditures is positively correlated with a higher level of self-rated well-being. Furthermore, household heads reporting higher levels of well-being for their family are on average younger and better educated. Moreover, households with a higher level of SWB will be more likely to increase their operational land size by renting in land, while it is less likely that they will decrease their operational farm size through renting out. Finally, it seems that people perceiving their well-being higher also give a higher rating to access to gas, electricity and water and to community well-being.
These average numbers already suggest some conclusions. In the next section we use an econometric model to explore more formally the determinants of a household's level of subjective well-being.
Empirical Analysis

The empirical model and variables
The general empirical model has the following structure Studies in psychology and economics often find a relationship between SWB and socioeconomic characteristics. The variables AGEHH and AGEHH2 measure the age of the household head and its square, respectively. SWB is often found to have a U-shaped pattern over age, declining until the mid-to late 40s and going up again afterwards (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2007) . The inclusion of the squared term should capture this possible nonlinear relation. We also include the variable EDUHH which measures the years of education of the household head and include the squared term (EDUHH2) to capture a possible nonlinear relation.
Education is typically positively associated with SWB. However, in transition countries some studies find that only the higher levels of education have a significant positive effect on subjective well-being, which is explained by the fact that many skills acquired during communism are not useful any more after transition (Namazie & Sanfey, 2001; Rizov et al, 2001; Sanfey & Teksoz, 2005) .
Another group of control variables are regional characteristics, which are found to have an impact on subjective well-being (see e.g. Di Tella et al., 2001) , and which are added to the other variables in Model 3. The dataset we use has extensive information about (household's perceptions of) community characteristics. We include indicators for community well-being, using principle component analysis to bundle information on the perceived availability of gas, electricity and water (ACCES UTILITIES) and on the perception of community well-being such as alcohol abuse and crime (COMMUNITY WB). To reduce dimensions, we applied principal component analysis to some of these indicators, retaining the principal components with the highest eigenvalue. Details can be found in appendix.
Including data based on subjective ratings as right-hand side variables can also be useful to control for potential measurement errors. Regression estimates can be affected by measurement errors related to the heterogeneity in rating scales or anchor: for some people, 7/10 is much while for others it is not (see Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998) . A second type of measurement error might rise due to mood variability: while some people can be equally happy on average, the variance in their happiness level can be different (see Frederickson & Kahneman, 1993; Ravallion & Lokshin, 2001) . One might assume that both types of measurement errors are correlated with other subjective data, so that including them can partly control for the problem.
The dataset contains variables that can be used to measure incomes of the households. We use indicators of both household expenditures per capita, which we use both for own households (in logarithmic form: LOG EXP PC) and for the neighbours as average neighbours' expenditures per capita (LOG MEAN EXP NEIGHB PC). The variable average neighbours' expenditures per capita is calculated similarly as the average neighbours' land holdings variable. A problem with the expenditure (and other income related variables) is that, in contrast to land ownership, it is much harder to argue that income is exogenous in the estimated contemporaneous relationship, as there may be spurious correlation with latent personality traits, genes, health, past experiences… which we are not able to sufficiently control for (see e.g. Cooper, 1999; Kohler et al., 2005) . We attempted to use an instrument for income or expenditures, but found that the best instrument was land, which is obviously, already included in the model. Therefore we add the expenditure variables in Model 4 mostly as a robustness test to see whether the main results are affected by including these variables.
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Estimation Results
As the dependent variable has a natural ordering from 1 (low well-being) to 3 (high well-being), and as economists assume ordinality rather than cardinality of utility 5 , ordered logit regressions are appropriate for the econometric analysis
Results for the regression models as discussed above are reported in table 4.
The estimation results show significant and robust effects in line with the hypotheses for the main variables, i.e. the effect of own and neighbours' land holdings on subjective well-being. The size of the land holdings of the household has a positive effect on SWB. The opposite is true for the land holdings of neighbours. The effect is highly significant and robust over the different specifications: households experience lower well-being if their neighbours have higher land holdings.
A somewhat remarkable result is that the estimated coefficient of neighbours' land is larger than the estimated coefficient of own land. This indicates that subjective well-being is stronger affected by differences in land ownership of the neighbours than by own land ownership, and which suggests that the comparison effect is very strong. Others have found similar effects in the literature. For example Luttmer (2005) in a study on the impact of income on subjective well-being in the United States finds similar relative effects for income, i.e. that the impact of neighbours' incomes are, in absolute terms, larger than own income effects.
Regarding the control variables, only some of the estimated coefficients are significant. The perceived availability of gas, electricity and water in the community is positively associated with subjective well-being: perceptions about the quality of the environment in which one lives are associated with one's overall self-rated well-being. 6 It may also be worth mentioning that we do not find the commonly U-shaped pattern of SWB over age. We could think of two reasons which explain this unusual result. Firstly, as interviews are taken from household heads, the age range of the respondents is rather limited. The youngest respondent is 23 years of age, and almost 69% of respondents is older than 45, which means that the majority of observations lies behind the turning point commonly found in the literature. Secondly, results might be clouded by cohort effects. Indeed, coefficients on the age-variables can capture the evolution of satisfaction over the life cycle, but could also capture differences in satisfaction caused by the fact that some people grew up in better times than others.
Further Robustness Tests
Tables 5 and the coefficients are also robust over the various models.
Second, to further analyse the robustness of the results to the specification of the models and the variables, we ran additional regression models, of which the results are presented in table 6. In Model 5, we separate households with less land than their neighbours (LOG MEAN LAND NEIGHB LESS) from those with more land than their neighbours (LOG MEAN LAND NEIGHB MORE). We find that the coefficients of the two terms are not significantly different. It thus seems that land of neighbours is a reference point for the relatively well-endowed as well as for the others. Putting it differently, for the well-endowed, an increase in the gap between own and neighbours' land holdings will increase subjective well-being, while the opposite is true for the less endowed.
A critique on our approach could be that we are measuring the aversion towards inequality or extremes within the village. In Model 6, we therefore replace in the log of mean land holdings by the log of median land holdings (LOG MED LAND NEIGHB), which should be more robust towards outliers. The regression output shows that the results are robust to this change in specification, which suggests that we are indeed testing for the effect of neighbours' land holdings, and not the effect of extremes.
To further investigate this latter issue, in Model 7 we replace mean land holdings by a Gini-coefficient for land holdings at the village level (GINI LAND).
The regression results show that the latter has no significant explanatory power for the level of subjective well-being.
Of course, it might be that inequality aversion is stronger for those who are relatively worse-off. Therefore, in Model 8,we interact GINI LAND with a dummy for having more resp. having less land than one's neighbours (GINI LAND MORE and GINI LAND LESS). However, none of the terms is significant either.
Regression specifications 9 and 10 are similar to 7 and 8 except that we now include LOG MEAN LAND NEIGHB again. We see that LOG MEAN LAND NEIGHB is robust to including a measure for inequality, which supports our conclusions.
One explanation why the Gini coefficient is not significant may be that the 1998 land reform in Moldova has occurred in a quite straightforward, fair, and transparant way. Moreover, land inequality within a village is rather small, with an average Gini of 30% ranging between 11 and 57%. Therefore, while our results
show that the effect of neighbours' land holdings are not driven by inequality aversion in Moldova, one should be careful in generalizing these findings, since the results could be quite different in a region where there is much more extensive land inequality.
Finally, to make sure that the results are not driven by observations for which neighbours land holdings are constructed from fewer observations, we also re-ran the regressions on a subsample of the data, i.e. only including those households for which the variable neighbours' landholdings has been constructed from at least 10 data points. The results (based on 406 instead of 437 observations) are not significantly affected by this change and are robust to using this subset of the data.
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In summary, these additional robustness tests indicate that the main finding of the paper are robust to changes in estimation techniques and model specifications.
Conclusion
The redistribution of land rights was a major issue in the transition processes of many countries in Asia and Europe. While there is a vast literature on the efficiency effects of land reform and land rights, less is known about the impact of the distribution of land on welfare. In this paper we attempt to measure directly how the distribution of land rights affects household welfare in poor countries. More specifically, we use subjective well-being ( In this study, we find that household land holdings have a positive effect on SWB but neighbours' average land holdings have a negative effect on SWB.
These results are robust to changes in the econometric specification. Land of neighbours has an equal impact on the well-endowed as on the less-endowed:
pride and deprivation seem to be symmetric. Even in a poor environment, the relative component of welfare seems at least as important as the absolute component.
These findings are important since they provide micro-based empirical evidence that is consistent with political economy studies findings on the importance of equity in land reform processes. While land distribution from large landowners to landless people or small owners may also positively affect efficiency, depending on certain institutional and market conditions (see e.g. Binswanger et al, 1995) , the demand for equity in land distribution is often very strong, and based on social rather than economic arguments. Political economy studies on the determinants of choices in land reform procedures during the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia find that demands for equity in the distribution of land rights played a very important role in the political negotiations and reform decision-making (see e.g. Cungu and Swinnen, 1998; Swinnen, 1999; Swinnen and Heinegg, 2001; Swinnen and Rozelle, 2006) . The findings of the present study that in a poor country such as Moldova where land is a very important asset for rural households, land ownership by neighbours in the village has a very strong effect on own welfare, is consistent with the importance of the equity factor in the political debates on the land reform processes. The fact that this effect is so strong in a country where, in a comparative perspective, land distribution was relatively egalitarian after 1998 -in contrast with countries such as Russia or Kazakhstan where the land reforms led in some regions to large concentration of land ownership -adds strength to the political implications of these effects. 
